By November 2021, gang violence in Haiti had reached levels that were shocking even by the grim standards of the preceding years. The United Nations reported that intentional homicides had increased by 14 percent in the first eight months of the year compared to the same period in 2020, and kidnappings had more than doubled. Port-au-Prince neighborhoods that had not previously been gang territory were now contested or controlled by criminal networks.
The vacuum created by the presidential assassination had emboldened gang networks that had previously operated with a degree of restraint imposed by political relationships with the government. With those relationships disrupted and a new government of uncertain legitimacy trying to establish its authority, gangs saw an opportunity to expand their power and territory.
The G9 coalition under Chérizier and rival networks engaged in violent confrontations for control of key neighborhoods and strategic locations, with civilian populations caught between them. Communities that had maintained relative normalcy through years of political crisis now found themselves in active conflict zones. Displacement within the capital accelerated as families fled the most dangerous areas.
Henry’s government had no effective security response to offer. The national police were outnumbered, outgunned in some confrontations, and their ranks were reportedly infiltrated by individuals with gang connections. The calls for international security assistance that had been made for years were becoming more urgent, but the international community had not yet agreed on what form that assistance should take or how it could be effective.