2021 had been the most catastrophic year in Haiti’s recent history — a year in which the assassination of the president, a major earthquake, a tropical storm, a gang blockade of fuel supplies, and an intensifying security crisis had combined to push the country to the edge of state collapse. Looking back from the end of December, it was difficult to identify a single major dimension of Haitian life that had not worsened.
The assassination of Moïse on July 7 had removed the last remaining nationally elected official and created a governance vacuum that the international community filled by consensus rather than constitutional process. The resulting government under Ariel Henry had uncertain legitimacy, contested authority, and faced immediate demands it could not meet: security, basic services, earthquake recovery, and the organization of elections that conditions made nearly impossible.
The August earthquake, killing more than 2,248 people and affecting hundreds of thousands more, had added a massive humanitarian emergency to the political crisis. The international response, while more organized than 2010, was still insufficient for the scale of need, and the security situation in some affected areas complicated delivery of assistance.
Gang networks had exploited the year’s political chaos to dramatically expand their territorial control and the sophistication of their operations. The fuel blockade imposed by G9 in October had demonstrated that criminal networks could bring the country to a halt, an exercise of power that the state had been unable to counter except through negotiated concession.
As 2022 approached, the central question for Haiti was not just whether things could improve — they would have to, simply to prevent complete collapse — but whether any of the political, security, or international actors with relevant roles had the capacity and the will to begin the enormously difficult work of stabilization.