The closure of Haiti’s main seaport and international airport during the March gang offensive caused an immediate and severe disruption to the food supply chains that sustained a country importing the majority of its caloric consumption. With both maritime and air importation interrupted simultaneously, prices for basic goods spiked within days as importers exhausted pre-existing inventories and could not resupply.
The food crisis that had been building for years reached a new acute phase as the supply chain disruption added to the effects of gang control of distribution networks, displacement of farming communities, and the purchasing power erosion caused by inflation and economic contraction. The World Food Programme updated its assessments sharply upward, warning that acute food insecurity was expanding rapidly as the March crisis added new dimensions to an already catastrophic food situation.
For families in Port-au-Prince who had been stretching minimal resources to cover food expenses, the sudden price spikes created immediate household emergencies. Market vendors who had maintained operations through previous crises found it impossible to source goods at prices their customers could afford. The informal food distribution networks that had served as a last resort for the most vulnerable populations were themselves disrupted by the insecurity of the streets.
Humanitarian organizations that had been providing food assistance to displaced and food-insecure populations found their own supply chains disrupted, with inability to receive international shipments limiting their capacity to maintain distributions at existing levels let alone scale up to meet the growing need. The food crisis was simultaneously a direct result of the security crisis and a factor deepening it, as hunger drove desperation that gang networks exploited.